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Abstract
The multi-group asset flow model is a nonlinear dynamical system originally developed as
a tool for understanding the behavioral foundations of market phenomena such as flash
crashes and price bubbles. In this paper we use a modification of this model to analyze the
dynamics of a single-asset market in situations when the trading rates of investors (i.e., their
desire to exchange stock for cash) are prescribed ahead of time and independent of the
state of the market. Under the assumption of fast trading compared to the time-rate of
change in the prescribed trading rates we decompose the dynamics of the system to fast
and slow components. We use the model to derive a variety of observations regarding the
dynamics of price and investors’ wealth, and the dependence of these quantities on the
prescribed trading rates. In particular, we show that strategies with constant trading rates,
which represent the well-known constant-rebalanced portfolio (CRP) strategies, are optimal
in the sense that they minimize investment risks. In contrast, we show that investors pursu-
ing non-CRP strategies are at risk of loss of wealth, as a result of the slow system not
being integrable in the sense that cyclic trading rates do not always result in periodic price
variations.
Introduction
Modeling of price and wealth dynamics is traditionally based upon the efficient market
hypothesis, which in its semi-strong form suggests that all publicly available information is
already reflected in asset prices. Thus, any pricing mistakes caused by behavioral biases or cog-
nitive errors are immediately exploited by rational investors with ample (usually assumed to
be infinite) capital [1]. As such, these mispricings are not systematic and asset prices may be
modeled as random processes [2]. This approach yields many valuable insights and forms the
foundation for modern studies of price dynamics and option pricing. However, there are
many phenomena, such as price bubbles and “flash crashes” that have significant economic
repercussions, and yet are not explained by this classical model. This has led to the existence
and growth of the field of Behavioral Finance (see, e.g. [3]) and the development of a variety of
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new models (e.g., [4–6]) designed to deal with situations in which investors do not act ratio-
nally, i.e., they do not immediately (and correctly) update their belief of the true value of the
asset upon receiving new information and make decisions that maximize their utility [7].
These models account for factors such as the recent trend in price and behavioral biases such
as conservatism (individuals are slow to update their beliefs when presented with new evi-
dence), the representativeness heuristic (individuals assess the probability of an event based
upon its similarity to an event with which the individuals are familiar), and overconfidence.
One such model, named the multi-group asset flow model uses differential equations to
study the dynamics of asset prices and investor wealth without making assumptions regarding
an infinite supply of capital, shares, and/or traders, or any external assumptions about price
evolution and volatility [8–14]. It has proven effective in describing the evolution of asset
prices in both experimental asset markets [15] and real world financial markets [10]. The
model has also provided insights into the bubble-bust phenomenon [13] by showing how a
change in the timeframe of interest for trend-based traders can result in a “flash crash,” where
the price drops within a short time by a significant amount. Originally, this model focused on
a single group of traders who focused not only on the intrinsic value of the asset, but also the
recent trend in price [8, 16]. The model was extended in [11] to accommodate multiple inves-
tor groups and then used to offer insights into the stability of prices [17, 18]. Indeed, the model
admits a range of both stable and unstable equilibria. Thus prices may start near an unstable
equilibrium and eventually settle near a stable equilibrium that may be very close to the initial
price. However, the price path (or excursion) from one equilibria to another may be quite
large and therefore economically significant [18]. None of the previous studies on the multi-
group asset flow model performed a slow-fast analysis of the dynamics of the system nor
treated traders’ strategies as predetermined inputs to the system. The model behavior is similar
to those of other studies that have considered heterogeneity in investor beliefs within deter-
ministic price models and attempted to explain market phenomena as consequences of the
(deterministic) trading behaviors of heterogeneous agents [10, 19–22].
As described in [11] and [17], the pricing equation in the multi-group asset flow model is
based on the standard microeconomic principle that the return is proportional to excess
demand (see [23]). Indeed, we start with the following price equation
t
1
P
dP
dt
¼
D   S
S
ð1Þ
where τ is a time scale characterizing the speed of the market. In the formulation of [17] and
[18], the multi-group asset flow model has the form:
t
dP
dt
¼ F   P ð2Þ
t
dNi
dt
¼
kiMi
F
  ~kiNi i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;G ð3Þ
t
dMi
dt
¼   kiMi þ ~kiNiF i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;G ð4Þ
and describes G investors (or investor groups), each endowed with two types of assets (shares
of a single non-dividend paying stock in the amount Ni and cash in the amount Mi), who
exchange these assets at rates specific to each investor and at a price P that is determined by
Dynamics in a trading model
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the ratio F of demand and supply:
F ¼
PG
i¼1 kiMi
PG
i¼1
~kiNi
: ð5Þ
The investor trading preferences are characterized by the trading rate functions, ki(t) and ~kiðtÞ,
which are to be interpreted as follows: The quantity kiMi represents the rate at which investor i
uses cash to buy stock, i.e., the proportion of cash that investor i submits per unit of time to
purchase shares. Similarly, the quantity ~kiNi represents the rate at which investor i sells the
stock, i.e., the proportion of shares that investor i submits for sale per unit of time. Hence,
the total supply (in terms of dollars), SP, of shares for sale in the market corresponds to
PG
i¼1
~kiNiP, while the demand (in terms of dollars), D, is represented as
PG
i¼1 kiMi. Thus, (2) is
obtained from (1) by substituting the appropriate values for S and D. (We direct the interested
reader to [17] for a detailed description of the model’s derivation as a limiting case of discrete-
time trading assumptions.)
The dynamics of the system (2)–(5) is determined by the market participants’ trading
rates, ki and ~ki, which vary in time according to the investors’ strategies. In the original
design of the multi-group asset model, the functions ki(t) and ~ki were chosen to be func-
tionals of the history of P or dP/dt up to the time t, reflecting situations in which traders
make decisions to buy/sell based upon the recent price’s deviation from some fundamental
value (fundamental or value investors) or the recent direction and magnitude of price
changes (momentum or trend-based investors) [17, 18], a choice that is traditionally made in
models of behavioral finance. In contrast, in this paper we focus on a different situation in
which each trader in the market specifies the trading rate as a prescribed function of time,
ki(t), independent of the dynamics of the market. Thus, the investor’s motivation to buy/sell
is not reactive but pre-planned. For example, the investor may choose to follow the so called
constant rebalanced portfolio (CRP) strategy in which the proportion of investor wealth in
different assets remains constant over a period of time by setting ki(t) = const. The investor
then effectively rebalances his portfolio by selling assets after they increase in price and buy-
ing after they decrease in price [24–27]. (CRP is also referred to as a “constant-mix” or
“fixed-mix” asset allocation strategy. A special case is the 1/n investment allocation, which
directs an individual holding a portfolio containing n assets to maintain a 1/n proportion of
wealth invested in each asset [28].) Another example of a pre-planned strategy is that of an
investor with a long-term investment horizon who maintains a percentage of 100 minus his
age in stocks and the remainder in bonds, i.e., ki(t) = 1 − αt; this strategy is common for
retirement accounts, e.g., StateFarm LifePath funds.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the performance of the CRP strategy and other
investment strategies, expressed as functions ki(t), by analyzing their effect on the price and
investors’ wealth. Since the behavior of the market depends on the strategies of all investors
participating in it, a change in ki(t) for one investor leads to changes in the wealth of all inves-
tors. We provide evidence supporting the use of CRP trading strategy as a default approach in
the dynamical system model if the strategies of other investors are not known in advance or if
the potential for loss of wealth is to be minimized. If others’ strategies are known, then we offer
improvements to this baseline heuristic and define strategies that lead to gains in wealth. Most
of the results we present can be considered intuitive. For example, it is known that if an inves-
tor knows in advance the strategy (plan of future market orders) of another trader, then the
investor can take advantage of this information and increase his wealth at the expense of the
other trader by preemptively performing the same sequence of market orders. This is similar
Dynamics in a trading model
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to the predatory trading strategy described in [29] and [30]. Our results confirm this intuitive
conclusion by providing mathematical validation within the constructs of the model, and by
quantifying the magnitude of the wealth gain or loss as a function of the strategies chosen by
the investors.
In our analysis we focus primarily on cyclic strategies in which ki(t) are periodic functions
of time with the same period, i.e., strategies in which the proportions of investors’ wealth
invested in the asset return to their starting values. We do this to better compare the relative
gain or loss in wealth of the investors by eliminating the gains from an overall increase in
demand for the asset (or losses from an overall decrease in demand). In this sense, our paper
analyzes trading gains and losses as opposed to market gains and losses, in the spirit of [31].
For simplicity, we assume that the market equilibrates on a time-scale τ that is shorter than the
time-scale of changes in trading rates of the investors, which reflects today’s trading speed of
electronic markets. This assumption leads to the separation of the dynamics of the system (2)–
(5) into fast and slow regimes.
The paper is organized as follows: the model framework and the dynamical system describ-
ing the market are introduced in the following section. The reduction of the system to the slow
time-scale and the resulting quasi-steady market dynamics formulation is stated in the “Slow-
fast analysis” section. The main findings are derived in the section “Effects of strategies on
investor wealth” and subsequently illustrated in examples presented in the “Numerical results”
section.
Model setup
As stated above, in this paper we study the multi-group asset flow model (2)–(5). The price P,
amounts of stock Ni and amounts of cash Mi are assumed to be non-negative, i.e., we do not
allow short selling of shares or borrowing of cash. The initial conditions are defined as P(0) =
P0, Ni(0) = Ni,0, and Mi(0) = Mi,0, with i = 1, 2, . . ., G. The system (2)-(6) has two conserved
quantities, namely the total amount of cash
PG
i¼1 Mi ¼ �M and the total number of shares
PG
i¼1 Ni ¼ �N and hence represents trading within a closed system [18].
In contrast with [18], the trading rates ki and ~ki are here treated as inputs or controls for the
system. For simplicity, just as in [17] and [18], we assume that ki(t)� 0, ~kiðtÞ � 0, and
kiðtÞ þ ~kiðtÞ ¼ 1: ð6Þ
i.e., each is both buying and selling the asset continuously as long as 0< ki(t)< 1. As observed
by [18], this assumption has an important implication: at constant ki, F in (5) is constant and
(2)–(4) reduce to a system of linear equations (see also the “Slow-fast analysis” section below).
We do not wish to elaborate on the mechanism by which trading is to be realized in practice,
but one possibility is that the investor continuously maintains unfulfilled buy or sell orders in
the market. Note that ki(t) = 1 corresponds to the (all-in) “buy and hold” strategy, where the
investor exchanges all of his cash for shares, while ki(t) = 0 corresponds to the investor divest-
ing himself of all shares (i.e., exiting the market).
The wealth of an investor can be measured by the total cash value of all assets the investor
owns:
Wi ¼ Mi þ NiP ð7Þ
Dynamics in a trading model
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207764 November 29, 2018 4 / 25
In view of (2)–(4), the time-rate of change of an individual investor’s wealth is given by
dWi
dt
¼ Ni
dP
dt
þ
dNi
dt
P þ
dMi
dt
¼ Ni
dP
dt
þ
dNi
dt
ðP   FÞ
¼ Ni
dP
dt
þ
dNi
dt
ð  t
dP
dt
Þ
¼ Ni   t
dNi
dt
� �
dP
dt
;
ð8Þ
which implies (not surprisingly) that when the price is constant, there is no change in the
wealth of any investor. It also implies that instantaneous positive growth of wealth can be
achieved by gradual buying, holding, or selling of the asset when the price is increasing (with
dNi/dt below Ni/τ) and buying of the asset when the price is decreasing (i.e., by keeping dNi/dt
above Ni/τ). Of course, any action taken by the investor will result in a market reaction that
will influence the future price.
The dynamics of wealth, Wi, can be better understood by analyzing a dynamical system
equivalent to (2)–(6) in which cash is replaced with wealth as a dependent variable:
t
dP
dt
¼ F   P ð9Þ
t
dNi
dt
¼
kiWi
F
  1   ki
F   P
F
� �
Ni ð10Þ
t
dWi
dt
¼   kiWi þ 2   ki
F   P
F
� �
NiF
� �
F   P
F
ð11Þ
with i = 1, 2, . . ., G, where
F ¼
PG
i¼1 kiWi   P
PG
i¼1 kiNi
PG
i¼1ð1   kiÞNi
ð12Þ
Note that Eqs (9)–(12) represent a closed system of differential equations with solution
depending uniquely on the initial conditions P(0) = P0, Ni(0) = Ni,0, Wi(0) = Wi,0, i = 1, . . ., G,
and the input functions ki(t).
The constant rebalanced portfolio (CRP) strategy can be naturally represented within the
model (2)–(6) (or, equivalently, the system (9)–(12)) as a strategy with a constant trading rate
ki. This is justified by the following considerations: By adopting a fixed ki strategy, the investor
has a guarantee that whenever the system reaches equilibrium, the proportion of his wealth in
the stock, Ni P/Wi, will be equal to ki and the proportion of his wealth in cash, Mi/Wi, will be
1 − ki (see also [18]). Outside of equilibrium these proportions will not necessarily be main-
tained due to a delay in the approach to equilibrium. However, the system will always move in
the direction of the appropriate wealth proportion defined by ki, i.e., the signs of dMi/dt and
dNi/dt will be such that the absolute difference |ki Mi − (1 − ki)Ni P| decreases. In the context of
the model (2)–(6) the 1/n strategy is represented by ki = 1/2, since there are only two assets in
each investor’s portfolio: cash and stock.
In the subsequent section we shall occasionally make use of vector notation with k = [k1, k2,
. . ., kG], M = [M1, M2, . . ., MG], N = [N1, N2, . . ., NG], and W = [W1, W2, . . ., WG]. In that
Dynamics in a trading model
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notation,
PG
i¼1 kiWi can be written as the dot product k �W, while
PG
i¼1ð1   kiÞNi can be writ-
ten as (1 − k) �N where 1 = [1, 1, . . ., 1], etc.
Slow-fast analysis
In this and the remaining sections of the paper we will treat τ as a small parameter and study
the dynamics of the system (2)–(5) in the limit as τ approaches zero, which is the case, for
example, for fast equilibrating markets that allow high-frequency trading. In traditional slow-
fast systems, the smallness parameter shows up in equations for a subset of the variables of the
system, and the system exhibits two distinct dynamical regimes: (i) rapid approach to slow
manifold and (ii) gradual movement along the slow manifold.
In the present case, the slow variables are the t-dependent functions ki(t). Since in the
Eqs (2)–(6) the time rate of change of every variable of the system is multiplied by τ, the fast
dynamics of that system can be characterized as a rapid approach to an equilibrium when all
trading rates ki are constant. For constant ki, (2)–(6) reduces to a system of linear ODEs with
G − 1-dimensional equilibrium manifold [18]
EM ¼ ðP;N;MÞ
�
�
�
�
�
N � 1 ¼ �N ; M � 1 ¼ �M ;
kiMi
ð1   kiÞNiP
¼ 1; i ¼ 1; . . . ;G
( )
ð13Þ
From any initial condition (P0, N0, M0) the system approaches EM along a linear trajectory
given by
PðtÞ ¼ P� þ ðP0   P�Þe  tt ð14Þ
NðtÞ ¼ N� þ ðN0   N
�Þe  tt ð15Þ
MðtÞ ¼ M� þ ðM0   M
�Þe  tt ð16Þ
where the equilibrium state ðP�;N�;M�Þ 2 EM obeys P� = (k �M0)/((1 − k) � N0),
N�i ¼ kiðMi;0=P
� þ Ni;0Þ, and M�i ¼ ð1   kiÞðMi;0 þ Ni;0P
�Þ [18].
Analogously, the system (9)–(12) converges to the G − 1 dimensional manifold
EW ¼ ðP;N;WÞ
�
�
�
�
�
N � 1 ¼ �N ; W � 1 ¼ �M þ �NP;
kiWi
NiP
¼ 1; i ¼ 1; . . . ;G
( )
ð17Þ
with P(t) and N(t) given by (14) and (15), and with
WðtÞ ¼W� þ ðW0   W
�Þe  2tt þ N�ðP0   P�Þð1   e  ttÞe  tt ð18Þ
where W� = M0 + N0 P�. (Note that the last term in the above equation vanishes both at t = 0
and as t!1.)
The slow dynamics of the system is due to the time-dependence of the trading rates ki which
results in a time-dependence of the equilibrium manifold. We can derive the reduced equa-
tions for such dynamics (also called the slow subsystem) by equating the lowest order terms in
τ in each of the Eqs (9)–(11). The order of terms in those equations can be better ascertained
Dynamics in a trading model
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by rewriting the equations in the following way:
t
dP
dt
¼ F   P ð19Þ
t
dNi
dt
¼
kiWi
F
  1   t
ki
F
dP
dt
� �
Ni ð20Þ
dWi
dt
¼   t
dNi
dt
dP
dt
þ Ni
dP
dt
ð21Þ
with i = 1, 2, . . ., G. By taking the limit τ! 0, we obtain the slow subsystem
0 ¼ F   P ð22Þ
0 ¼
kiWi
F
  Ni ð23Þ
dWi
dt
¼ Ni
dP
dt
ð24Þ
with i = 1, 2, . . ., G. Note that, in view of the Eqs (22) and (23), the expression for F in (12)
becomes an identity in the slow subsystem. The system is completed by providing an equation
for dP/dt which can be obtained by differentiation of (12) while assuming that the functions
ki(t) are bounded away from 0 and 1, continuously differentiable for all t. (See S1 Text.) In
summary, the slow subsystem is given by:
dP
dt
¼
P
PG
i¼1
dki
dt
Wi
PG
i¼1ð1   kiÞkiWi
ð25Þ
dWi
dt
¼
kiWi
P
dP
dt
; i ¼ 1; � � � ;G ð26Þ
with initial conditions P(0) = P0, W(0) = W0. For any solution (P(t), W(t)) we can recover
M(t) and N(t) using Eqs (23) and (22) as Ni(t) = ki(t)Wi(t)/P(t) and Mi(t) = (1 − ki(t))Wi(t).
The conservation laws for shares and cash imply that any solution of (25)-(26) obeys the rela-
tions
XG
i¼1
kiðtÞWiðtÞ ¼ �NPðtÞ;
XG
i¼1
ð1   kiðtÞÞWiðtÞ ¼ �M ð27Þ
Note that the solution of (25)-(26) lies on the equilibrium manifold EW . Since we are solving
the dynamics of a quasi-steady state process, we must take the initial values to be in EW as well.
Any initial values P0 and W0 for which (27) are satisfied at t = 0 describe such an equilibrium.
(The constants �M and �N can be set in advance or determined by the initial conditions via
(27).)
The following lemma describes some general observations about the dependence of the
solutions of the system (25)-(26) on the trading rates ki(t), which are essential for the proofs of
all remaining results in this paper.
Lemma 1. Let (P(t), W(t)) be a solution of the system (25)-(26) on the interval [0, T] with
trading rates k(t) and initial conditions P(0) = P0, W(0) = W0. It follows that
Dynamics in a trading model
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1. dk(t)/dt �W(t) >(<) 0 for t 2 [0, T] if and only if dP(t)/dt>(<) 0 and, consequently, dWi(t)/
dt>(<) 0 for t 2 [0, T] for all i, 1� i� G.
2. If (k(t) − k(0)) �W0 = 0 for t 2 [0, T], then W(t) = W0 for t 2 [0, T].
3. If dki(t)/dt = 0 for t 2 [0, T] and some i, 1� i� G, then
WiðtÞ
Wi;0
¼
PðtÞ
P0
� �ki
; 8t 2 ½0;T�
In particular, if P(T) = P0 then Wi(T) = Wi,0.
4. If there are constants α1, α2, . . ., αG, β such that
PG
j¼1 ajkjðtÞ ¼ b for t 2 [0, T], then
W1ðtÞ
W1;0
!a1
W2ðtÞ
W2;0
!a2
� � �
WGðtÞ
WG;0
!aG
¼
PðtÞ
P0
!b
; 8t 2 ½0;T�
0
@
0
@
0
@
0
@
5. If there are nonzero constants η1, η2, . . ., ηG, and a function f(t) such that ki(t) = ki,0 + ηi f(t)
for t 2 [0, T], then for any i, 1� i� G,
WiðtÞ
Wi;0
 ! 1
Zi PðtÞ
P0
� �ki;0
Zi
¼ gðPðtÞÞ
where g(P) is defined implicitly as the function of P that satisfies the following relation (for all
P):
XG
i¼1
Wi;0
P
P0
� �ki;0
gðPÞZi ¼ �M þ �NP:
6. For any i, j, 1� i, j� G, the ratio Wi(t)/Wj(t) instantaneously increases with t if and only if
ðkiðtÞ   kjðtÞÞ dPdt > 0.
7. If ð~PðtÞ; ~WðtÞÞ is a solution of (25)-(26) with initial conditions P(0) = βP0, W(0) = α W0,
where α,β> 0, and with trading rates ~kðtÞ ¼ kðsðtÞÞ where σ(t) is a monotone increasing dif-
ferentiable function, then
ð~PðtÞ; ~WðtÞÞ ¼ ðbPðsðtÞÞ; aWðsðtÞÞÞ
The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in S2 Text.
In the context of the model, the mathematical statements of Lemma 1 can be interpreted as
follows:
1. no investor can gain wealth when price falls or lose wealth when price increases, and the
price increases if and only if the direction of the change in trading rates is along the direc-
tion of the wealth vector,
2. no investor gains or loses wealth as long as the change in trading rates remains orthogonal
to the vector of starting wealth,
Dynamics in a trading model
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3. if any investor pursues the CRP strategy, then his wealth is a monotone function of the
price. In particular, after any process in which the price returns to its starting value his ter-
minal wealth equals his initial wealth.
4. when the trading strategies of all investors are constrained by a linear relation, then the
wealths of all investors and the price are related by a multiplicative constraint.
5. when the trading strategies of all investors form a linear path in the trading rate space then
the wealth of any investor can be expressed as a nonlinear function of the price (a generali-
zation of (iii)).
6. one investor gains wealth relative to another investor if and only if the difference in their
trading rates corresponds to the direction of change in price,
7. the dynamics of the system (25)-(26) is rate invariant, and independent of the scaling of the
price, and the wealth vector.
Effects of strategies on investor wealth
We shall now analyze several special scenarios in which the majority of investors pursue CRP
strategies and study the gain or loss in wealth of the remaining investors. We begin by focusing
on the case in which all investors follow the CRP strategy, which leads to an especially simple
market behavior. Then we assume that one or two investors depart from the constant trading
rate strategy, pit the participants against each other, and determine the winners and losers.
All CRP strategies
In the scenario where all investors pursue CRP strategies, the behavior of the system is particu-
larly simple. It follows from (25) that during quasi-steady state dynamics the price stays con-
stant (since the system starts already in equilibrium) and so does the wealth of each of the
investors.
One non-CRP strategy
In the scenario where one investor chooses to pursue a non-CRP strategy while all others pur-
sue CRP strategies, the price no longer remains constant. Intuitively, when the investor
chooses to increase his holdings of the asset (i.e., the proportion of his wealth in the asset com-
pared to his total wealth), the price will increase, and so will the wealth of all other investors.
However, we show that in this scenario, upon return to the original holdings (i.e., after one
period of a cyclic trading strategy) the price returns to its original value and so does the wealth
of all investors in the market.
Suppose that all investors pursue CRP strategies except for investor i = 1. Using Lemma 1
(iii) we can rewrite the system (25)-(26) as a two-variable system:
dP
dt
¼
PW1
ð1   k1Þk1W1 þ
PG
i¼2ð1   kiÞkiCiPki
dk1
dt ð28Þ
dW1
dt
¼
k1W1
P
dP
dt
ð29Þ
where Ci ¼Wi;0=P0
ki . Note that both Eqs (28) and (29) are of the type dX/dt = A(t)dk1/dt
where A is positive. It follows that the functions P(t) and W1(t) are monotone increasing
(decreasing) whenever k1(t) is monotone increasing (decreasing).
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Consider now the system:
d~P
dx
¼
~P ~W 1
ð1   xÞx ~W 1 þ
PG
i¼2ð1   kiÞkiCi~Pki
ð30Þ
d ~W 1
dx
¼ x ~W 1 ~P
d~P
dx
ð31Þ
This system has locally Lipschitz r.h.s everywhere in the positive quadrant, and hence the IVP
(30)-(31) with initial conditions 0 < ~Pðx0Þ and 0 < ~W 1ðx0Þ, 0< ξ0 < 1, has a unique solution
in that domain. Furthermore, this system has two first integrals which are derived from (27)
and take the form:
x ~W 1 þ
XG
i¼2
kiCi~P
ki ¼ �N ~P ð32Þ
ð1   xÞ ~W 1 þ
XG
i¼2
ð1   kiÞCi~P
ki ¼ �M ð33Þ
These integrals form a system of algebraic equations for ð~P; ~W 1Þ, which has a unique solution
ð~PðxÞ; ~W 1ðxÞÞ for each ξ in the interval [0, 1].
The following observation follows from the above derivations and from Lemma 1(vii): If
~PðxÞ and ~W 1ðxÞ are solutions of the IVP (30)-(31) with ~Pðk1ð0ÞÞ ¼ P0 and ~W 1ðk1ð0ÞÞ ¼W1;0,
then the functions PðtÞ ¼ ~Pðk1ðtÞÞ, W1ðtÞ ¼ ~W 1ðk1ð0ÞÞ solve the IVP (28)-(29) with initial
conditions P0 and W1,0. This result has important implications for the change in wealth along
cyclic strategies, i.e., strategies for which ki(T) = ki(0) for some T> 0 for i = 1, 2, . . ., G. A cyclic
strategy represents the case in which an investor temporarily increases (or decreases) his rela-
tive investment in the asset before returning to the original proportion. This is commonly
done for speculative reasons, in order to take advantage of market fluctuations. A particular
case is when the investor enters the market, trades for a finite interval of time, and then exits
the market (in this case k1(T) = k1(0) = 0). The result, summarized in the following theorem,
implies that there will be no net change in the investor’s wealth after a cyclic strategy is exe-
cuted in a quasi-steady state process, provided all other investors pursue CRP strategies.
Theorem 2. Let (P(t), W(t)) be a solution of the system (25)-(26) on the interval [0, T] with
trading rates k(t) and initial conditions P(0) = P0, W(0) = W0. If k1(T) = k1(0) and dki(t)/dt = 0
for t 2 [0, T], 2� i� G, then P(T) = P0 and W(T) = W0.
In other words, in a quasi-steady process, if one investor executes a cyclic non-CRP strategy
while all other investors execute CRP strategies, then the final wealth of every investor equals
the starting wealth, and the final price equals the starting price. See Fig 1 for an illustration of
this result.
Two non-CRP strategies
When two investors are executing non-CRP strategies simultaneously, the outcome is different
from the previous two cases. As we shall see below, even if the strategies are cyclic, the wealth
of both investors can change over one cycle, i.e., one of the investors may gain wealth while the
other loses wealth. For example, if one investor becomes aware that another, distressed trader
may need to temporarily liquidate his holdings, the first investor can choose to sell before the
distressed trader is able to, thereby lowering the price, and subsequently buy back the asset at a
Dynamics in a trading model
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lower price. Both traders then execute a cyclic strategy but the first one loses while the second
one gains wealth. Another scenario is when information becomes public at time t1 causing
both investors to buy the asset. Subsequently, new information becomes available at time t2 >
t1 causing both investors to sell. If investor 1 is able to act before investor 2 in both cases, then
investor 1 increases his terminal wealth at the expense of investor 2. This type of behavior is
called predatory trading [29, 30]. Below we show it is detrimental to the investor’s wealth to be
the second-mover or follower of another’s trading strategy (i.e., to not be the first investor to
act).
The system with time-dependent trading rates k1(t) and k2(t) while others maintain fixed
rates can be analyzed as follows. In view of Lemma 1(iii), (25)-(26) reduce to:
dP
dt
¼
P W1
dk1
dt þW2
dk2
dt
  �
ð1   k1Þk1W1 þ ð1   k2Þk2W2 þ
PG
i¼3ð1   kiÞkiCiPki
ð34Þ
dW1
dt
¼
k1W1
P
dP
dt
ð35Þ
dW2
dt
¼
k2W2
P
dP
dt
: ð36Þ
Using the relations (27), we can express W1 and W2 in terms of P as
W1 ¼
PN^ðPÞð1   k2Þ   M^ðPÞk2
k1   k2
ð37Þ
W2 ¼
M^ðPÞk1   PN^ðPÞð1   k1Þ
k1   k2
ð38Þ
with N^ðPÞ ¼ �N  
PG
i¼3 kiCiP
ki   1, M^ðPÞ ¼ �M  
PG
i¼3ð1   kiÞCiP
ki , and Ci depending on the
initial condition. Note that finiteness and positivity of W1 and W2 requires that whenever t = t�
Fig 1. One non-CRP investor. Dynamics of a market with one non-CRP investor who enters and then exits the market in accord
with the trading rate k1(t) (panel (a)), and five CRP investors with randomly chosen parameters. In panel (b), the price P (solid red),
the wealth W1 (dashed green) of the non-CRP investor, and the wealth of each CRP investor (solid cyan) first increase and then
return to their initial values.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207764.g001
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where k1(t�) = k2(t�) = k�, then P� = P(t�) is determined by k� as the solution of
P�N^ðP�Þð1   k�Þ ¼ M^ðP�Þk�: ð39Þ
Note also that @ðPN^ðPÞÞ=@P > 0 while @M^ðPÞ=@P � 0.
Substitution into (34) yields a single equation for P:
dP
dt
¼ P
PN^ðPÞ ð1   k2Þ
dk1
dt   ð1   k1Þ
dk2
dt
� �
  M^ðPÞ k2
dk1
dt   k1
dk2
dt
  �
ðk1   k2Þ½PN^ðPÞð1   k1Þð1   k2Þ þ M^ðPÞk1k2 þ SðPÞ�
ð40Þ
where SðPÞ ¼
PG
i¼3ð1   kiÞkiCiP
ki . Note that the constants Ci in N^ðPÞ, M^ðPÞ, and S^ðPÞ are
determined by the initial conditions (P0, W0). Clearly, the Eq (40) is singular whenever k1(t) =
k2(t) and hence its solution is not defined at those points. Thankfully, (39) defines the values of
P(t) for all such t.
Eq (40) is difficult to solve analytically, but we can obtain information about the behavior
of the system by using Lemma 1. First of all, we can deduce from Lemma 1(vii) that the final
wealth of each investor after one cycle is independent of how fast the system travels along
the cycle, but depends only on the initial conditions (P0, W0) of the system and the path
γ = {k(t)|t 2 [0, T]} of the system in the k-space. A cyclic strategy is then represented by an
oriented closed path γ.
The next theorem relates the changes in P and Wi for any cyclic strategy. We have seen in
the section above that by maintaining the CRP strategy, the investor minimizes any risk of loss
of wealth over a cyclic strategy if one investor in the market does not follow the CRP strategy.
Unfortunately, this is no longer true if two or more investors follow time-dependent strategies.
In such a situation, at the end of the cycle the price P need not return to its original value, and
any change in price will result in a change of wealth even for the CRP investors. In addition,
between the two investors with non-CRP strategies, one investor’s wealth will increase at the
expense of the other.
Theorem 3. Let (P(t), W(t)) be a solution of the system (25)-(26) on the interval [0, T] with
initial conditions P(0) = P0, W(0) = W0 and trading rates k(t) such that dki(t)/dt = 0 for t 2 [0,
T], 3� i� G, while k1(t) and k2(t) on the interval [0, T] form a closed curve γ in the (k1, k2)
plane. Then for 3� i� G,
sgnðW2ðTÞ   W2;0Þ ¼   sgnðW1ðTÞ   W1;0Þ;
sgnðWiðTÞ   Wi;0Þ ¼ sgnðPðTÞ   P0Þ ¼ sgnððW1ðTÞ   W1;0Þðk1ð0Þ   k2ð0ÞÞÞ
The proof of Theorem 3 is provided in S3 Text.
Let us now focus on special paths γ for which we can deduce the sign of the change in
wealth of investors 1 and 2. Lemma 1(ii) tells us that if a segment of that path is orthogonal to
W then W is constant along that segment. Furthermore, Lemma 1(iv) tells us that along path
segments that lie on lines passing through the origin, i.e., for which α1k1(t) + α2k2(t) = 0, there
is a special relation between W1(t) and W2(t), namely
W1ðtÞ
W1;0
!a1
¼
W2ðtÞ
W2;0
!  a2
ð41Þ
  
Together, we can use these results to construct special strategies corresponding to quadrilateral
paths along which W1 (or W2) increases (or decreases) during one cycle. Schematic depiction
of changes in W when investor strategies follow the quadrilateral path ABCD outlined in
Lemma 4 are shown in Fig 2.
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Lemma 4. Let (P(t), W(t)) be a solution of the system (25)-(26) on the interval [0, T] with ini-
tial conditions P(0) = P0, W(0) = W0 and trading rates k(t) such that dki(t)/dt = 0 for t 2 [0, T],
3� i� G, while k1(t) and k2(t) on the interval [0, T] form a path in the k-space that is a counter-
clockwise labeled quadrilateral ABCD with vertices A = k(0) = k(T), B = k(tB), C = k(tC), D = k
(tD), where 0< tB< tC< tD< T, the side AB is orthogonal to W0, the sides BC and DA lie on
distinct lines passing through the origin, the side CD is orthogonal to W(tC), and A is the vertex
with the largest k1. ThenW1(T)>W1,0 andW2(T)<W2,0.
The proof of Lemma 4 is provided in S4 Text.
A generalization of Lemma 4 can be obtained for a system that consists of CRP investors
and two non-CRP investors who follow an arbitrary piecewise smooth Jordan path:
Theorem 5. Let (P(t), W(t)) be a solution of the system (25)-(26) on the interval [0, T] with
initial conditions P(0) = P0, W(0) = W0 and trading rates k(t) such that dki(t)/dt = 0 for t 2 [0,
T], 3� i� G, while k1(t) and k2(t) on the interval [0, T] form a piecewise smooth Jordan curve γ
in the (k1, k2) plane. ThenW1(T) −W1,0 > 0 (and consequently W2(T) −W2,0 < 0) if and only if
γ is traveled counterclockwise.
The proof of Theorem 5 is provided in S5 Text.
In the context of the model, Lemma 4 and Theorem 5 state that if two investors change
their preferences along a non-intersecting curve in the (k1, k2) plane then investor 1 gains
wealth if the curve is traveled counterclockwise and loses wealth if the curve is traveled clock-
wise. The result can also be interpreted in the following way: in order to gain wealth, investor 1
must anticipate the changes in the strategy of investor 2 so that the peak in k1(t) precedes the
peak in k2(t) and the trough of k1(t) precedes the trough in k2(t). In that case, investor 2, whose
wealth decreases throughout the process, can also be observed as the follower of the changes in
the trading rate of investor 1. This is similar to the predatory trading scenario described in [29]
and [30] where investor 1 would be considered the predator and investor 2 the distressed
trader.
Theorem 5 has an important consequence that exemplifies the importance of CRP strate-
gies for minimization of investment risks. In an environment consisting of CRP investors,
once one investor (say investor 2) departs from the CRP investment strategy, there is a risk
Fig 2. Two non-CRP investors. Dynamics of a market with two non-CRP investors whose strategies follow the closed quadrilateral
path in the (k1, k2) plane traversed counterclockwise as ABCDA (panel (a)). In panel (b), both the price P (solid red) and the wealth
W1 (dashed green) finish above the starting values, while wealth W2 (dash-dot blue) finishes below. (The green arrows in panel (a)
here and in the figures below, depict the vector W at selected points along the path.)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207764.g002
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that another investor (say 1) may anticipate the strategy of investor 2 and adjust his strategy so
as to gain wealth at the expense of investor 2. This can be formalized as:
Theorem 6. Let (P(t), W(t)) be a solution of the system (25)-(26) on the interval [0, T] with
initial conditions P(0) = P0, W(0) = W0 and trading rates k(t) such that dki(t)/dt = 0 for t 2 [0,
T], 3� i� G. For any piecewise smooth non-constant cyclic strategy k2(t), t 2 [0, T], and any K
there exists a cyclic strategy k1(t) with k1(0) = k1(T) = K such that W1(T) −W1,0 > 0 andW2(T)
−W2,0 < 0.
The proof of Theorem 6 is provided in S6 Text.
The last theorem shows that if a trader deviates from a CRP strategy, then this trader is sus-
ceptible to a decrease in wealth should another trader decide to also deviate. Thus, the CRP
strategy is rational in that any trader who departs from the CRP strategy can potentially do
worse with respect to his change in wealth. Indeed, the CRP strategy is first about minimizing
risks and then about maximizing profits.
Before proceeding to the numeral analyses of the model, we summarize the theoretical
results of this section. Theorem 2 implies that if all but one investor follow a CRP strategy,
then after any cyclic change in the trading rate of the non-CRP investor (and potential tempo-
rary increase or decrease of price) both the price and the wealth of all investors return to their
initial values. (This describes, for example, the scenario in which a non-CRP investor enters
the market, trades the asset for a while, and then sells the asset and exits the market.) Theorems
3, 5, and 6 state that if two investors follow cyclic non-CRP strategies, then (i) wealth will be
transfered from one investor to the other, (ii) the direction of the wealth transfer benefits the
investor who pre-empts the other’s strategy, and (iii) every non-CRP strategy can lead to a loss
of wealth by the choice of an appropriate competing non-CRP strategy (i.e., no non-CRP strat-
egy is safe). If the price changes during this process, then the terminal wealths of the CRP trad-
ers will also change. However, as our numerical studies shown below indicate, the changes in
wealth of the CRP investors are order of magnitude smaller than those of the non-CRP inves-
tors. From a game-theoretic perspective, Theorem 6 suggests that the CRP strategy minimizes
risk among all potential investor strategies, and hence is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of
the system when considered as a differential game with wealth gain representing the payoff.
Numerical results
Here we present numerical studies of various trading scenarios illustrating the results in the
previous sections and a few additional observations. Our primary objective is the analysis of
the dynamics of traders’ wealth using the scenario in which all traders adhere to CRP strategies
as the baseline. We then consider the impact to investors’ wealth positions as certain investors
begin to follow non-CRP strategies. The initial wealth of each non-CRP investor has been
scaled to one to facilitate interpretation of the economic meaning of the graphical/numerical
results presented in this section. Moreover, the percentage change in wealth (as well as price)
is included in Table 3.
As our first example, let us consider a scenario in which a non-CRP investor joins a market
consisting of five CRP investors, trades for a set period of time, and then exits the market.
(Note that the trading rate functions, ki(t), are assumed to be continuous. Discontinuous trad-
ing rates will be discussed in a future study.) This represents a cyclic strategy for the single
non-CRP investor as the initial trading rate, k(0) = 0, equals the ending trading rate, k(T) = 0,
where T is the period of one cycle (see Fig 1(a)). Thus, Theorem 2 applies and the terminal
wealth should equal the initial wealth for each investor in the system. Indeed, consider Fig
1(b). The wealth curves for the CRP investors (thin lines) follow the relation, WiðtÞ ¼ CiPðtÞ
ki ,
given in Lemma 1(iii). Note that Ci, i = 2, . . .5, was randomly chosen in the simulations. The
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ending price P(T) is equal to P0, and Wi(T) are equal to Wi,0, to within the accuracy of numeri-
cal simulations. Not surprisingly, the main result of the addition of a single non-CRP investor
to a market of CRP investors is an increase in demand for the asset which leads to an increase
in price by a factor of 3.5, amounting to a price “bubble” as the non-CRP investor increases his
holdings in the asset. The price maintains its high level until the non-CRP investor begins his
exit from the market. [12] conjecture bubbles may result from the actions of momentum trad-
ers with bubbles cresting when these traders run out of cash. Here we see the occurrence of a
bubble when a single investor enters the market. In both scenarios there is an influx of cash
driving the bubble—consistent with theoretical [9], experimental [15, 32], and empirical [33]
studies.
As our second example, let us consider a scenario with two investors who follow trading
preferences along the polygonal curve depicted in Fig 2(a), which satisfies the assumptions of
Theorem 4. Indeed, the curve is traveled counterclockwise starting at A. Sides BC and DA lie
on distinct lines through the origin, while side AB is perpendicular to W(t0) = (W1,0, W2,0) =
(1, 1), and side CD is perpendicular to W(tC). The green arrows represent the vector (W1, W2)
at selected points along the strategy path. Note that in accord with Lemma 1(ii), W is constant
along AB and along CD, while along BC and along DA, W rotates clockwise in accord with
Lemma 1(iv). As a result, there is a net change in W1 and W2 along the cycle, i.e., W1(T)>
W1,0 and W2(T)<W2,0, as indicated by two arrows at the starting point A corresponding to
W(0) and W(T). Fig 2(b) displays plots of the price and the wealths of both investors versus
time.
In the next set of examples, we consider the scenarios corresponding to a market with seven
traders of which two follow cyclic trading strategies, while the rest follow CRP strategies. The
closed strategy paths in Fig 3(a) and 3(c) are traversed counterclockwise (ABCDA) with k1(t)
< k2(t) in Fig 3(a) and k1(t)> k2(t) in Fig 3(c). The curves in Fig 3(e) and 3(g) are the same as
in 3(a) and 3(c), but traversed clockwise (ABCDA) with k1(t)< k2(t) in Fig 3(e) and k1(t)>
k2(t) in Fig 3(g). Fig 3(b), 3(d), 3(f) and 3(h) display the corresponding evolution of the price
and wealths of investors one through seven. Investors 3 through 7 adhere to CRP strategies
with parameters that were chosen randomly and kept identical for all path choices in Fig 3.
The results shown in these figures are consistent with the results of Theorem 3, in that the
Table 3. Percentage change in price and wealth of each investor for Figs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8.
non-CRP CRP
Fig P W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8
1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
2 54.40% 95.20% -19.04%
3b -5.100% 7.550% -14.630% -2.580% -4.900% -1.770% -3.020% -1.170%
3d 11.68% 19.78% -7.820% 5.660% 11.19% 3.830% 6.680% 2.500%
3f 5.560% -8.080% 15.94% 2.740% 5.330% 1.860% 3.220% 1.220%
3h -10.54% -17.63% 7.350% -5.400% -10.14% -3.720% -6.310% -2.460%
4b 0.000% 4.220% -4.220% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
4e -1.420% 1.130% -2.690% -0.710% -1.360% -0.490% -0.830% -0.320%
6b 0.000% -0.016% 0.016% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
6c -0.002% -0.017% 0.014% -0.001% -0.002% -0.001% -0.002% -0.001%
7 -0.150% -1.990% 1.830% -0.080% -0.150% -0.100% -0.120% -0.070%
8 -2.600% 20.11% -22.23% -35.97% -0.920% -2.160% -1.530% -1.440% -2.380%
Percentage changes in price and the wealth of investors following either non-CRP or CRP strategies.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207764.t003
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price (and consequently the wealth of all CRP investors) decreases along the cycle if the path is
traveled counterclockwise and k1(t)< k2(t), or if the path is traveled clockwise and k1(t)>
k2(t). Incidentally, in this example all curves are also Jordan curves hence the outcome is con-
sistent with the results of Theorem 5, in that W1(T)>W1,0 for curves traveled counterclock-
wise and W1(T) <W1,0 for those traveled clockwise.
In the next set of figures, let us look more closely at scenarios in which investor 1 anticipates
the actions of investor 2. This scenario is an appropriate idealization of cases in which a news
announcement is made at time t = 0 causing both investors to sell the asset, but investor 1 is
able to act more quickly than investor 2. Thus, investor 1 reduces his position in the asset
(from 60% of his wealth to 40%) from time t = 0 to t = 1, i.e. along the line segment AB in Fig
4(a). At this point investor 2 begins to sell, while investor 1 maintains his position. Next, sup-
pose another piece of information becomes available at time t = 2, point C, causing the inves-
tors to buy. Again, investor 1 is able to react more quickly (along line segment CD), while
investor 2 does not begin to buy until time t = 4, point D. While the investors begin and end
with the same strategy in the (k1, k2) plane, point A, and have the same initial wealth, Wi = 1,
the ending wealth of investor 1 has increased, while that of investor 2 has decreased (see Fig
4(b)). By pre-empting the moves of his fellow investor, investor 1 gains wealth (i.e., W1(T)>
W1,0) at the expense of investor 2. As noted in the prior section, the peak (trough) in k1(t) pre-
cedes the peak (trough) in k2(t). This is depicted graphically in Fig 4(c). The trough for investor
2 occurs during 2� t� 3, while the trough for investor 1 occurs for 1� t� 2. Similarly, the
peak for investor 2 begins at t = 4, while the peak for investor 1 occurs from t = 3 to t = 4. Note
that the scenarios depicted in Fig 4 are similar to the predatory trading scenario described in
[29] and [30]. In particular, Fig 4 is analogous to Figs 1 and 2 in [29].
As follows from Theorems 3 and 5 and is depicted in Fig 3, if all but two investors (say
investors 1 and 2) utilize CRP strategies, then Wi(T) <Wi,0, i� 3, provided k1(0)< k2(0) and
the curve in (k1, k2) plane is traversed counterclockwise. Interestingly, note that investor 1
need not hold a large position in the asset in order to negatively impact the price and
Fig 3. Two non-CRP investors. Dynamics of a market with two non-CRP and five CRP investors (with randomly
chosen parameters). The non-CRP investors 1 and 2 follow strategies corresponding to the closed paths (traversed as
ABCDA) in panels (a), (c), (e), and (g), and give rise to dynamics in panels (b), (d), (f), and (h), respectively. In (b) and
(d), the wealth W1 (dashed green) finishes above its starting value and W2 (dash-dot blue) finishes below (since the
path is traveled counterclockwise), while in (f) and (h) the situation is reversed. The wealth of the CRP investors (solid
cyan) is essentially unchanged. The price (solid red) finishes above its starting value in (d) and (f) and below in (b) and
(h).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207764.g003
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subsequently the wealth of all other investors. Indeed, consider Fig 4(d) and 4(e) in which
investor 1 begins with 20% of his wealth in the asset, reduces to 10%, and ends again with 20%.
In this scenario the wealths of investors 2 through 7 decrease by an average of 2%, while the
price drops 3.2%.
It is interesting to note that the inclusion of additional CRP traders acts as a dampener on
the system. That is, as the number of CRP investors increases, the wealth changes for all inves-
tors (including the non-CRP investors) decrease. Using the scenario of Fig 4(b) as an example,
if we fix the strategies of non-CRP investors 1 and 2, and change the number of CRP investors
to 0, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, or 50, then the change in wealth of investor 1 is 8.12%, 6.49%, 6.37%,
4.22%, 3.00%, 1.75%, 0.87%, respectively. This follows from equation (34) that models the
change in price. The numerator is a sum over the two non-CRP investors, while the denomina-
tor is a sum over all investors. Thus, as the number of CRP investors grows, the instantaneous
change in price decreases. And, equations (35) and (36) imply that instantaneous changes in
the wealth of the non-CRP investors is proportional to the change in price. From an economics
perspective, CRP investors will sell (buy) to rebalance their portfolio in response to an increase
(decrease) in price. This, of course, exerts a downward (upward) pressure on the price thereby
mitigating the price change. As the number of CRP investors in the market increases, this
effect will be magnified resulting in smaller and smaller price changes. Recall that non-CRP
investor 1 increases his wealth by preempting the trading strategy of non-CRP investor 2.
Larger price changes correspond to larger gains (losses) for investor 1 (2). Thus, the inclusion
of additional CRP investors decreases the potential for gains by investor 1.
In the next example we explore the effect of the area enclosed by the path in (k1, k2) plane
on the magnitude of wealth increase/decrease along the path. We performed seven simulations
of a market with seven investors consisting of two non-CRP investors (1 and 2) and five CRP
investors. In each simulation the strategies of investors 1 and 2 vary along a counterclockwise
Fig 4. One non-CRP investor gains at the expense of a second non-CRP investor. Dynamics of a market with two
non-CRP investors that follow strategies in panels (a) and (d) (traversed counterclockwise as ABCDA). In panels (b)
and (e), the wealth W1 (dashed green) finishes above its starting value while the wealth W2 (dash-dot blue) finishes
below. The price (solid red) and the wealth of CRP investors (solid cyan) are essentially unchanged. Panel (c) shows
how in panel (a) the trading rate k2 of investor 2 (dash-dot blue), follows with a delay that of investor 1, k1 (dashed
green).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207764.g004
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square path labeled Si (here S1 denotes the square with the largest area and S7 the square with
the smallest area) with starting vertex A = (0.7, 0.7) (see Fig 5). Investors 1 and 2 each begin
with an initial wealth of 1, and the starting price is 0.9. The initial wealths and strategies for
investors 3-7 were randomly chosen and then used for each of the seven simulations. Consis-
tent with Theorem 5, the relative change in wealth is positive for investor 1 and negative for
investor 2. Moreover, note that the magnitude of relative change in wealth decreases for both
investors as the area of the square traversed decreases (see Table 1). Since k1(0) = k2(0) in this
scenario, in accord with Theorem 3, investor 1’s increase in wealth comes solely at the expense
of investor 2, and there is no difference between the beginning and ending price.
All preceding examples describe scenarios in which the strategies of two investors form
non-intersecting paths in the (k1, k2) plane, with the possible addition of several CRP investors
with constant ki. In the next set of examples we explore the dynamics of a market with a total
of seven investors, in which a cyclic strategy path of investors 1 and 2 intersects itself once
Fig 5. Two non-CRP investors’ wealth along inscribed squares. Seven square paths in the (k1, k2) plane. The largest
square, S1, is labeled ABCD.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207764.g005
Table 1. Relative change in wealth of non-CRP investors 1 and 2 along each square path in Fig 5.
Investor S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
One 0.1668 0.1269 0.0929 0.0645 0.0414 0.0235 0.0106
Two -0.1.668 -0.1269 -0.0929 -0.0645 -0.0414 -0.0235 -0.0106
The area of the square decreases from S1 to S7.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207764.t001
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forming two closed “loops.” Again, the parameters for CRP investors 3 through 7 were ran-
domly chosen and then the same values were utilized in each simulation.
First we consider a symmetric lemniscate path in which the two loops (IABCI and IDEFI)
enclose equal areas, shown in Fig 6(a). The remaining panels of this figure show that the evolu-
tion of price and wealths of all investors is strongly dependent upon the starting point on the
path. The dynamics shown in Fig 6(b) pertains to the case in which the lemniscate path starts
and ends at the intersection point I, traces the “left-hand” loop in a clockwise direction
(IABCI), and then follows the “right-hand” loop in a counterclockwise direction (IDEFI). As
Table 2 shows, after completing the first loop, the wealth of investor 2 has increased at the
expense of investor 1, and there is no change in price, consistent with Theorems 3 and 5. As
the second (“right-hand”) loop is traversed in a counterclockwise manner, the wealth of inves-
tor 1 increases while the wealth of investor 2 decreases, and there is no change in price (again
consistent with Theorems 3 and 5 applied to the path IDEFI). The increase in W1 in the second
loop is not large enough to make up for the decrease in W1 in the first loop, and hence the
overall result is a decrease in wealth of investor 1 when the complete lemniscate (IABCIDEFI)
is traveled. The dynamics shown in Fig 6(c) are produced by following the lemniscate in the
same direction, but starting and ending at the apex E of the right loop. (Note that the same ini-
tial wealths, price, and ki values were utilized to produce the figures in panels (b) and (c).)
Although the ending wealths and price are similar as in the previous situation (see the second
and third panels in Table 2), they are not identical, since the starting point E is such that
k1(0)>k2(0) and, in accord with Theorem 3, price decreases during the process. Therefore, the
choice of the starting point for the excursion around the strategy curve has significant effect on
the dynamics of the system.
Fig 6. Two non-CRP investors’ strategies corresponding to a lemniscate. Dynamics of a market with two non-CRP
investors and five CRP investors with randomly chosen parameters. Investors 1 and 2 follow strategies corresponding
to the lemniscate path in panel (a). For strategies corresponding to the path traveled as IABCIDEFI (b) or as
EFIABCIDE (c), the wealth W1 (dashed green), the wealth W2 (dash-dot blue), the price (solid red), and the wealth of
CRP investors (solid cyan) return essentially to their starting values.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207764.g006
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In the next example we consider a self-intersecting path that is not symmetric and which
has two loops (IFAB and ICDE) that enclose unequal areas (see Fig 7(a)). We start at the point
A and move to the left passing through the points BICDEIF and returning to A. Note the oscil-
latory behavior of the price and wealth curves in panel (b). Although the ending wealths are
similar to the initial wealths (see the bottom panel of Table 2), investor 1 loses while investor 2
gains wealth, which is consistent with the fact that the loop that is traveled clockwise (IFABI) is
larger in area than that traveled counterclockwise (ICDEI). Note that the wealth of each inves-
tor (whether a CRP or a non-CRP investor) may vary dramatically throughout the timeframe.
The last example describes a market with three non-CRP investors following cyclic trading
strategies where all three investors react to information in the same manner (i.e., they tempo-
rarily alter their trading preferences ki), but investor 1 acts first followed by investor 2 and then
by investor 3 (see Fig 8(a) which is traversed as ABCDEFA). In Fig 8(b), similar to Fig 4, one
can also observe a transfer of wealth: after one complete cycle, only investor 1 experiences an
increase in wealth, while investors 2 and 3 both have a decrease in wealth. Moreover, the
wealth of investor 3 (the last investor to act) declines more than that of investor 2. The curves
Fig 7. Two non-CRP investors’ strategies corresponding to a non-symmetric lemniscate. Dynamics of a market
with two non-CRP investors and five CRP investors with randomly chosen parameters. The non-CRP investors 1 and
2 follow strategies corresponding to the path in panel (a) traversed as ABICDEIFA. In panel (b) the price (solid red),
the wealth W1 (dashed green), and the wealth of CRP investors (solid cyan) finish below their starting values, while the
wealth W2 (dash-dot blue) finishes above.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207764.g007
Table 2. Changes in price and investor wealth.
P W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7
Initial 0.9000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8551 1.0334 1.0391 1.0452 0.9870
Left-hand loop IABCI
Δ 0 -0.0147 0.0147 0 0 0 0 0
Lemniscate path IABCIDEFI
Δ(×103) 0 -0.156 0.156 0 0 0 0 0
Lemniscate path EFIABCIDE
Δ(×103) -0.020 -0.168 0.141 -0.010 -0.023 -0.015 -0.019 -0.010
Self-intersecting curve ABICDEIFA
Δ -0.0013 -0.0199 0.0183 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0007
Changes in price and the wealth of the non-CRP investors (1 and 2) and the CRP investors (3 through 7) corresponding to one excursion around the curves defined in
Figs 6 and 7. The initial price and wealth are chosen to be the same for each scenario.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207764.t002
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in panel (c) of Fig 8 also demonstrate that investor 1 is the first to act, while investor 3 is the
last to act.
To facilitate interpretation of the above results as well as clearly identify their economic sig-
nificance, we present the percentage change in price and wealth of each investor in Table 3.
Conclusion
We have utilized the multi-group asset flow model of Caginalp and collaborators to examine
the performance of CRP strategies and to better understand the wealth dynamics of both CRP
and non-CRP investors. Similar to the Merton (1971) framework, the asset flow equations we
utilize here form a continuous time model with no transaction costs. We find that if all inves-
tors adhere to CRP strategies, then the wealth of each investor along with the price is constant.
If, however, one investor follows a non-CRP strategy, while all other investors utilize CRP
strategies, then the wealth of each investor as well as the price is no longer constant. Although
the ending wealth (i.e., wealth at the end of each period of the non-CRP investor’s strategy) of
all investors equals the initial wealth, provided that the non-CRP investor follows a cyclic strat-
egy, the wealth trajectories of all investors are not constant. Indeed, the strategy of the non-
CRP investor affects the demand for the asset and may result in a price bubble or a drop in the
price and consequently a rise or a drop in the wealth of each investor.
As noted in the Introduction, several studies have considered the impact of heterogeneous
investor beliefs on price and wealth dynamics via deterministic pricing models. Here we
abstract away from the specific motivation (classical or behavioral) to focus on the impact of
Fig 8. Three non-CRP investors. Dynamics of a market with three non-CRP investors and five CRP investors with
randomly chosen parameters. The non-CRP investors 1, 2, and 3 follow strategies corresponding to the polygonal path
in panel (a), which is traversed as ABCDEFA. Panel (b) shows the price (solid red curve), W1 (dashed green), W2
(dash-dot blue), W3 (magenta circles), and the wealth of CRP investors (thin solid cyan). Panel (c) shows investors’
trading rates versus time. Note that investor 2’s actions follow those of investor 1 and investor 3’s actions follow those
of investor 2.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207764.g008
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time-dependent trading strategies. In the baseline case, constant trading strategies correspond
to CRPs. Then, by allowing the trading strategy to vary over time, we are able to consider the
wealth dynamics of various scenarios. For example, can a trader with a time dependent strat-
egy increase his/her wealth when all other traders adhere to CRP strategies? Alternately, sup-
pose an investor plans to enter the market for a period of time and then exit the market.
Within the realm of CRP strategies, are there situations in which this investor can be assured
of not losing wealth? The value of our results is two-fold. First, we provide rigorous mathemat-
ical support and explanation for some commonly used strategies and intuitive investment
practices, and second, we provide a framework in which more complicated relations of many
investment strategies can be evaluated and their outcomes described in a quantitative fashion.
Our results compare to (and are consistent with) those of previous studies. Indeed, [28]
provides a robust summary of the literature regarding the 1/n strategy and points out that:
(i) the 1/n strategy is difficult to outperform in a volatile market and (ii) behavioral studies
note the prevalent intuitive use of 1/n strategies in a variety of settings. With respect to the for-
mer point, the authors also show that the 1/n strategy is a rational choice when the investor is
faced with a high degree of model uncertainty. In [34], the authors perform an empirical study
using monthly data for the 30 Fama-French industry portfolios. Employing an out-of-sample
analysis to compare the performance of the 1/n strategy to the Mean-Variance efficient portfo-
lio with the same level of risk, they find that the 1/n strategy outperforms the Mean-Variance
portfolio for smaller portfolios (n< 30), while the Mean-Variance portfolio outperforms for
larger (n>= 30) portfolios. In [35] the 1/n rule was used as a benchmark against which 14
other trading strategies were tested. The authors found that none of these more “sophisticated”
strategies, including a “minimum variance” portfolio strategy in which the only objective was
to minimize the variance of returns (i.e., risk), consistently outperforms the 1/n strategy with
respect to the Sharpe ratio, certainty-equivalent return, or turnover. These results, which relate
a version of the CRP strategy to risk minimization, are similar to the main takeaway of Theo-
rem 6.
We have limited our study to cases in which the strategies of all investors are constant or
periodic with commensurate period. This was done because we are interested in the differ-
ences in investor wealth arising from the investors’ use of distinct trading strategies and not
from an overall increase/decrease in the market price. That is, we focus on the relative transfer
of wealth between investors (due to their choice of strategy) and not the wealth trends com-
mon to all investors. Our results can be generalized to scenarios in which price, and conse-
quently the wealth of all investors, increases monotonically due to a steady change in demand
or supply.
The model can also handle strategies such as the (all-in) “buy and hold” strategy (ki(t) = 1)
as well as a complete exit from the market (ki(t) = 0). It is fairly common for an investor to use
a portion of his cash to buy shares of the asset and then simply hold them along with the
remainder of his cash. We consider this to be a partial buy and hold strategy, which may be
treated as a mixed strategy with ki(t) = 1 applied to part of the investor’s holdings and ki(t) = 0
to the rest. As such, the strategies for both parts of the investor’s holdings fall under the cate-
gory of CRP strategies and our results apply.
Our main result considers two investors (identified as investors 1 and 2) who follow cyclic
non-CRP strategies corresponding to a Jordan curve in the (k1, k2) strategy plane. In that case,
if the curve is traversed in the counterclockwise direction, the ending wealth of investor 1
increases (primarily) at the expense of investor 2. This suggests that if investor 1 is able to
anticipate the action of investor 2, then he may profit at the expense of investor 2. In plain
words, this result corresponds to the commonly accepted notion that it is better to be the first
mover rather than a follower when reacting to trading news/activities. It is noteworthy that in
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the case of two non-CRP investors any CRP investors may gain or lose wealth. Numerical sim-
ulations, though, suggest these losses (or gains) are much smaller than those incurred by the
“trailing” non-CRP investor.
In this study we assume (i) the investors’ trading strategies, ki(t), are continuous and (ii) the
traders’ actions influence the price. Moving forward, we intend to examine the wealth dynam-
ics when these assumptions are relaxed. Indeed, suppose the trading strategies were piecewise-
constant instead of continuous. This might be a truer reflection of actual trading strategies,
where investors update their portfolios on a periodic basis. In addition, suppose the traders
in the market are “small” in the sense of [36], i.e., the traders’ actions do not impact the price.
As [37] find that market depth has increased over the years both at and behind the NBBO
(national best bid and offer), it is reasonable to consider scenarios in which traders are price
takers. That is, for a majority of small investors trades have minimal (if any) effect on market
prices. Consider, for example, traders with small(er) positions trading in highly liquid securi-
ties (e.g., Dow Jones stocks).
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